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At the end of April, President Maithripala Sirisena’s  100-day programme of governance reforms culminated
with the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment to reduce the powers of the presidency. Asanga
Welikala reviews the progress that has been made since January, and argues that despite
difficulties and necessary compromises, the Amendment represents a change for the better in Sri
Lanka’s governing arrangements.
With the election of Maithripala Sirisena to the presidency in January 2015, Sri Lanka embarked on
a 100-day programme of constitutional and governance reforms. The promise of far-reaching
changes to abolish, or at least substantially reduce, the powers of the executive presidency had been the keystone
of Sirisena’s presidential campaign. The previous President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had not only constitutionally
extended the powers of this already over-mighty institution, but had also extra-constitutionally instituted a control
regime based on nepotism, clientelism, ethnic chauvinism, and corruption. Sweeping away this institutional
apparatus of authoritarianism and its more informal – but also more ingrained – network of patronage and protection
through constitutional reforms brought together the otherwise disparate coalition of political forces that supported
Sirisena’s candidacy.
While reforming executive presidentialism was the centrepiece of the 100-day programme, it also included a raft of
other proposals, including freedom of information legislation and reforms to the parliamentary committee system, as
well as economic reliefs. This collection of policy proposals did not make for the most coherent of programmes, and
neither did it seem realistic within a 100-day period. Predictably perhaps, the government’s energies have been
focused on the presidential reforms and other proposed measures have fallen by the wayside, bar some measures
to ease the cost of living, and some small but symbolically significant steps toward ethnic reconciliation. Corruption
prosecutions in particular have been conspicuous by their absence. However, the excesses of the Rajapaksa
regime had been such that the majority that voted for its ouster has been willing to settle for progress on the main
issue.
The coalition that was cobbled together around Sirisena’s candidacy included parties that supported outright
abolition of the executive presidency as well as some that supported more moderate reforms. Disagreement
therefore surfaced after the election when the new government had to frame the constitutional amendment in
concrete terms. Even though it did not threaten the fall of the government, the public airing of disagreements among
parties represented in the Cabinet contributed to a sense that the reform process was disorganised and at times in
disarray. Moreover, the assumption had been that all parties in Parliament would fall in line with the new President’s
reform mandate. Despite Rajapaksa’s defeat, however, a large section of the former President’s parliamentary
coalition continued their loyalty to him. In the hope of returning him to active politics if not to power in the forthcoming
parliamentary election, they sought to obstruct the reform process as much as they could. The absence of a settled
view on reform or abolition within the government helped the opposition’s tactics.
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Despite these difficulties, the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution was passed with the requisite two-thirds
majority in Parliament on 28 April 2015. This involved a great deal of backroom negotiation that deprived the
process of much transparency, and there was no certainty until the last moment that its passage was assured. While
in the event the opposition voted with the government, this support was secured only by conceding a number of its
demands, which had the effect of significantly diluting the original reform proposals. The opposition has also
demanded that electoral reforms be introduced in conjunction with the presidential and governance reforms. The
government has accepted this in principle and suggested that these be embodied in a future Twentieth Amendment,
but it is not clear whether or not this will be passed before the forthcoming parliamentary election.
The Nineteenth Amendment Bill underwent several iterations before it was passed. The first version was the most
radical in terms of cutting down presidential powers by transferring virtually all executive powers to the Cabinet of
Ministers. While the President would continue to be directly elected, and retain certain powers in exceptional
situations, in substance the presidency was rendered largely ceremonial in terms of the day-to-day running of the
government by the requirement that he acts on the advice of the Prime Minister. Some of this was initially diluted due
to opposition from those within the government opposed to complete abolition. More importantly, the Supreme
Court, which has the power to determine whether any constitutional amendment requires to be approved at a
referendum (in addition to a two-thirds majority in Parliament), declared that several provisions as proposed by the
government would need a referendum. These included the removal of the President’s powers to appoint and
reshuffle the Cabinet, which the Bill proposed transferring to the Prime Minister. Keen to avoid a referendum, the
government undertook to remove these clauses when the Bill was presented to Parliament.
When the Bill entered the parliamentary process, the opposition’s focus of critique was on the composition of the
Constitutional Council: the body that would recommend presidential appointments to the new independent
commissions overseeing elections, the public service, the judicial service, the police, and bribery and corruption,
and which would also approve presidential appointments to high posts such as judges of the superior courts. The Bill
proposed that the majority of the Constitutional Council would be independent persons, although it would also
include the Speaker as chair and the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. Just before the second
reading of the Bill, the government agreed to seven MPs and three independents for its membership, reversing the
non-party political composition of the Council, and in this way obtained the opposition’s votes for the Nineteenth
Amendment.
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Notwithstanding these compromises and deviations from the original position, the Nineteenth Amendment
represents a change for the better in Sri Lanka’s governing arrangements. In the best possible reading, the
President no longer commands, but has to work in cooperation with a Cabinet of Ministers that is responsible to
Parliament. This can be seen as restoring a semblance of balance to a constitution that had given the presidency
overwhelming pre-eminence before. It has reduced the terms of both President and Parliament to five years from
the previous six, it has provided that these terms are (more or less) fixed, and it has reintroduced the two-term limit
on presidential office. It has made the President’s exercise of power susceptible to the fundamental rights
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As mentioned above, re-empowered independent commissions would oversee
key state services and the Constitutional Council will regulate presidential appointments. Thus the Nineteenth
Amendment establishes both a better structural balance between the executive and the legislature, and a
substantial framework for de-politicisation.
In his first few months in office, President Sirisena has also established a more modest, conciliatory, and public
service ethos in the office, in stark contrast to the extravagance and autocratic style of his predecessor. Most
significantly, he is the only President to have delivered on a promise to reduce his own powers after election. That
fact alone makes the Nineteenth Amendment a historic constitutional milestone in Sri Lanka’s ongoing political
development. In the past few years, the Rajapaksas only exacerbated a much longer, decades-long trajectory of
institutional decay and soft authoritarianism that has seen Sri Lanka dissipate its much-vaunted democratic promise
at the moment of decolonisation. Reversing this trend will take much time and concerted and sustained effort. But
there is enough in the Nineteenth Amendment – and the commitment to its birth shown by its progenitors – to offer
some hope that the decline could at last be arrested.
In the next few months, Parliament will be dissolved ahead of elections. The present government has strongly
indicated that, if returned, it would seek to introduce a new constitution. While no detailed plans have been outlined,
this would presumably abolish presidentialism altogether and, crucially, address the central issue of ethnic pluralism
and devolution that was not included in the 100-day programme. Both President Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremasinghe have strong moral and political incentives to deal with this vexed set of issues, for they have both
been major beneficiaries of ethnic minority support. However, given that finding a constitutional settlement to this
issue has eluded Sri Lanka throughout its post-colonial existence, the difficulties involved in a future constitution-
making exercise cannot be overstated.
But before that, the general election must be won. The new government has restored a sense of political freedom
and the rule of law and is repairing Sri Lanka’s badly damaged external relations, especially with India and the West.
Even with the successful passage of the Nineteenth Amendment under its belt, however, the government cannot
easily assume a victory. A Rajapaksa revival is underway, and although much diminished as a political force without
the leadership of a major party and without access to state power and public resources, his loyalists need only do
well enough to deny the government an overall majority to derail the reform agenda in the next Parliament. If on the
other hand the government – or rather the electoral majority of January 2015 – is able to inflict a second successive
defeat on Rajapaksa and his acolytes this year, then the political arena can be cleared of their toxic influence for
several more years, if not forever. This would avail the much-needed political space to negotiate and introduce the
devolution and power-sharing reforms that are critical to the future stability and peace of Sri Lanka.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the India at LSE blog, nor of the London
School of Economics. Please read ourcomments policy before posting. 
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